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IS WHAT YOU GIVE, REALLY WHAT YOU GET? THE EFFECT
OF GOLAN V. HOLDER ON THE DETERIORATION OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN
Robert F. Kappers*

I. INTRODUCTION
Apple Inc. had astonishing 2011 sales, including 70 million iPhones,
30 million iPads, and 59 million other products.1 In 2008, Bloomberg
described Apple’s late CEO Steve Jobs as the man who “helped make
personal computers as easy to use as telephones, changed the way
animated films are made, persuaded consumers to tune into digital
music and refashioned the mobile phone.”2 Yes, there is no doubt Mr.
Jobs was good, but was he that good? After all, he did not actually
invent the telephone,3 computer,4 or MP3 player.5 Mr. Jobs merely
replicated these inventions—and replication is often labeled with
negative connotations like “plagiarize,” “steal,” or “rip-off.”
But the essence of creation and invention is to utilize old works as the
building blocks for the new.6 Of course, no one would consider Mr.
Jobs a second-rate copyist. To the contrary, many consider him as one
of the most brilliant figures in the past century.7 Mr. Jobs has helped us
see the advantages of using the “public domain”—works whose
intellectual property rights are inapplicable, expired, or forfeited—and
building off that knowledge to improve upon what already exists. Our
* Associate Member, 2011–2012, University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. Bob Evans, Apple Inc.: 10 Astonishing Facts, FORBES (Jan. 24, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sap/2012/01/24/apple-inc-10-astonishing-facts-3/.
2. Matthew Moore, Steve Jobs Obituary Published by Bloomberg, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 28, 2008),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/howaboutthat/2638481/Steve-Jobs-obituary-published-byBloomberg.html.
3. Alexander Graham Bell is credited with inventing the telephone, and was the first to patent
the new technology. Who Is Credited as Inventing the Telephone?, LIBR. CONGRESS (last visited Aug.
16, 2012), http://www.loc.gov/rr/scitech/mysteries/telephone.html; U.S. Patent No. 174,465 (filed Feb.
14, 1876).
4. Konrad Zuse is credited with building the world’s first working computer, “the Z3.” Judith
Holzer, Konrad Zuse and the Invention of the Computer, JUDITH HOLZER. MOVIES, GRAPHICS (Oct.
2010), http://www.judithholzer.net/Konrad-Zuse-and-the-Invention-of-the-Computer.
5. Kane Kramer was the inventor of the digital audio player. See KANE KRAMER,
http://www.kanekramer.com (last visited Aug. 16, 2012).
6. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (“From their
inception, the federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance between the need to promote
innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to
invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.”).
7. See generally A.N. Wilson, Brilliant, Yes, But He Wasn’t an Einstein, MAIL ONLINE (Oct. 7,
2011, 4:11 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2046237/Steve-Jobs-dead-Brilliant-yeswasnt-Einstein.html.
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world would not nearly be the same without Mr. Jobs’s inventions, or
access to the works of William Shakespeare,8 or if Detroit had to
reinvent the wheel, literally and figuratively.
The U.S. Supreme Court recently struck a blow to the public domain
in Golan v. Holder.9 This Note addresses the Court’s recent decision
upholding the constitutionality of § 514 of the Uruguay Round
Agreement Act (URAA), a federal statute permitting Congress to extend
copyright protection to works previously in the public domain. Part II
provides background information on copyright and patent law,
specifically the importance of the public domain and the recent activity
that threatens it. Part III discusses the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Golan v. Holder, and Part IV provides a discussion of how the Court
improperly performed the balancing required by the Constitution’s
Copyright and Patent Clause,10 setting precedent that will have a
sweeping impact on intellectual property law.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Copyright and Patent Law
The United States Constitution empowers Congress to “promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries.”11 The Copyright and Patent Clause embodies two separate
grants of power—“first, to establish a copyright system and, second, to
establish a patent system.”12 Furthermore, the Clause itself reflects U.S.
copyright and patent law’s purpose of stimulating the development of
creative works13 and encouraging technological innovation.14 As the
Supreme Court described, “[the Copyright and Patent Clause] is
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the
provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the
8. See Jeremy Hylton, The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, TECH,
http://shakespeare.mit.edu/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2012).
9. 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Bonito Boats, 489 U.S at 146.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
12. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (“[T]he constitutionally-stated purpose of
granting patent rights to inventors for their discoveries is the promotion of progress in the ‘useful
Arts.’”). Likewise, the constitutionally-stated purpose of granting copyrights to authors for their
writings is the promotion of progress of science. Id.
13. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) (“As we have explained, the economic
philosophy behind the Copyright Clause is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors.”)
(citation omitted).
14. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146.
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products of their genius.”15
Though the Copyright and Patent Clause has been interpreted to
bestow upon Congress these two broad powers, the Supreme Court has
consistently recognized that the “clause is both a grant of power and a
limitation.”16 More specifically, the federal copyright and patent
systems must, by “constitutional command,” “promote the Progress of
[Science and] useful Arts” (Progress Clause).17 Additionally, Congress
is bound by the “limited times” provision, barring it from granting
monopolies of infinite duration18 in order to avoid “monopolies which
stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of
Science and useful Arts.’”19
The Supreme Court is well practiced in addressing the interpretation
of Article I, Section Eight, Clause Eight, including the limited times
provision and the Progress Clause.20 For example, in Graham v. John
Deere Co. of Kansas City, the Court discussed the purpose of patent law
in relation to the Copyright and Patent Clause while addressing the
patentability requirement of non-obviousness.21 The Court stated,
“Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to
remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free
access to materials already available.”22 Instead, when establishing a
copyright and patent system, Congress “by constitutional command
must ‘promote the Progress of useful Arts’”—a standard that “may not
be ignored.”23
In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., the Supreme Court

15. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
16. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
18. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204; Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146.
19. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146.
20. See id. (“The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage
innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance
in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’ As we have noted in the past, the Clause contains both a
grant of power and certain limitations upon the exercise of that power.”); Graham, 383 U.S. at 6
(“Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available. Innovation,
advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent
system which by constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.’ This is the
standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.”) (emphasis added); Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003) (“The rights of a patentee or copyright
holder are part of a carefully crafted bargain, under which, once the patent or copyright monopoly has
expired, the public may use the invention or work at will and without attribution.”) (internal citations
omitted). But cf. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 (“We have also stressed, however, that it is generally for
Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives.”).
21. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–6.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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held that federal patent law preempted a Florida statute making it
unlawful to use a process already being used by another boat hull
manufacturer without written permission from that manufacturer.24 In
reaching its conclusion, the Court held the Copyright and Patent Clause
mandates that patent law “embod[y] a careful balance between the need
to promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement
through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very
lifeblood of a competitive economy.”25 Thus, the Court found that the
Florida statute ran contrary to the purpose of patent law by
“substantially imped[ing] the public use of otherwise unprotected design
and utilitarian ideas embodied in unpatented boat hulls.”26
The Court has made similar remarks favoring the right to copy works
or inventions already in the public domain in both TrafFix Devices, Inc.
v. Marketing Displays, Inc and Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp.27 The Court in TrafFix held that a design for use in a display
sign could be copied because it was functional and thus not protectable
under federal trademark law.28 “Unless an intellectual property right
such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to
copying.”29 Likewise, in Dastar the Court held that § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act did not support Fox’s false designation of origin claim,
because holding otherwise “would create a species of mutant copyright
law that limits the public’s federal right to copy and to use expired
copyrights.”30
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court’s tone was slightly more
threatening to the public domain and the public’s right to copy.31 Justice
Ginsburg, also the author of Golan v. Holder,32 wrote Eldred’s majority
opinion, where the Court held that the Copyright Term Extension Act
(CTEA)—an act that extended copyright duration to all future and thenexisting copyrights—was neither invalid on the basis of the Copyright

24. 489 U.S. at 146 (“The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage
innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance
in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”).
25. Id. “[W]e have consistently reiterated the teaching of Sears and Compco that ideas once
placed before the public without the protection of a valid patent are subject to appropriation without
significant restraint.” Id. at 156.
26. Id. at 157.
27. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003); TrafFix
Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
28. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29.
29. Id. (“[C]opying is not always discouraged or disfavored by the laws which preserve our
competitive economy.”).
30. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34 (internal citations omitted).
31. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
32. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
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and Patent Clause nor the First Amendment.33 In reaching this
conclusion, Justice Ginsburg rejected arguments that the Act created a
copyright term that was “virtually perpetual,”34 and instead found that
the limited times provision of the Copyright and Patent Clause should
not be interpreted such that a time prescription becomes forever fixed or
inalterable.35 “The word ‘limited,’ however, does not convey a meaning
so constricted . . . . [A] time span appropriately ‘limited’ as applied to
future copyrights does not automatically cease to be ‘limited’ when
applied to existing copyrights.”36 The Court also rejected the argument
that without further consideration from the author, extending copyright
duration to existing copyrights “fails to promote the Progress of Science
and ignores copyright’s quid pro quo.”37 Instead, the Court found that
the consideration for creating works includes any benefit of later
legislative extension of the copyright term.38
B. The Road to the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA)
In order to establish uniform international copyright relations, many
foreign nations agreed to the Berne Convention for Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention), which took effect in
1886.39 Berne Convention members agreed to treat authors from other
member countries as well as they treat their own.40 Importantly, the
Berne Convention mandates that a work must be protected abroad unless
its copyright term has expired, either in the country where protection is
claimed or the country of origin.41
Late to the table, the United States became a party to the Berne
Convention’s copyright guidelines in 1989.42 Despite becoming a
member, the United States initially did not comply with the Berne
Convention’s instruction that “member countries—including ‘new
accession to the Union’—protect foreign works under copyright in the
33. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194.
34. Id. at 210 n.16.
35. Id. at 199.
36. Id. at 187–88.
37. Id. at 210 (internal numbering omitted).
38. See id. at 215.
39. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 1, Sept. 9, 1886, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; see also Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 877
(2012).
40. Berne Convention, supra note 39, at art. 5(1) (“Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for
which they are protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country of
origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as
the rights specially granted by this Convention.”).
41. Berne Convention, supra note 39, at art. 18(1)–(2); Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878.
42. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 877.
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country of origin.”43 Instead, Congress withheld protection to “any
work that is in the public domain in the United States.”44 Though other
members to the Berne Convention expressed irritation with the United
States’ failure to enact retroactive protection,45 the Berne Convention
did not provide a “potent enforcement mechanism.”46 To the contrary,
the Berne Convention offered no sanctions for noncompliance and
allowed parties to declare themselves not bound.47
The Berne Convention grew teeth in 1994 when the United States
joined both the World Trade Organization (WTO)48 and the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS
Agreement).49 The TRIPS Agreement mandates implementation of the
Berne Convention’s first twenty-one articles, including Article 18,
which would require nations to retroactively grant copyright protection
Furthermore,
over works previously in the public domain.50
noncompliance with the TRIPS Agreement, and consequently the Berne
Convention’s twenty-one initial articles, would render the United States
subject to WTO enforcement including possible tariffs or cross-sector
retaliation.51
Congress abandoned its previous refusal to grant retroactive copyright
protection when it passed the URAA in 1994.52 Specifically, § 514 of
the URAA extended copyright to works protected in their countries of

43. Berne Convention, supra note 39, at art. 18(1), (4); Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 879.
44. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 879.
45. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 880 (“Mexican authorities complained about the United States’ refusal
to grant protection, in accord with Article 18, to Mexican works that remained under copyright
domestically. . . . The Register of Copyrights also reported ‘questions’ from Turkey, Egypt, and Austria.
Thailand and Russia balked at protecting U.S. works, copyrighted here but in those countries’ public
domains, until the United States reciprocated with respect to their authors’ works.”) (internal citations
omitted).
46. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 880.
47. Berne Convention, supra note 39, at art. 33(2)–(3).
TRADE
ORG.,
48. What
Is
the
WTO?,
WORLD
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2012) (“The World
Trade Organization (WTO) is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade
between nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s
trading nations and ratified in their parliaments. The goal is to help producers of goods and services,
exporters, and importers conduct their business.”).
TRADE
ORG.,
49. Understanding
the
WTO:
The
Agreements,
WORLD
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2012) (“The
WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), negotiated in the
1986–94 Uruguay Round, introduced intellectual property rules into the multilateral trading system for
the first time.”).
50. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 9(1), Apr. 14,
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; Berne Convention, supra note 39, at art. 18.
51. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 881 (2012).
52. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 108 Stat. 4809 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§
104A, 109(a) (1994)).
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origin that were previously in the United States’ public domain for any
of the following three reasons: (1) lack of copyright relations between
the country of origin and the United States at the time of publication, (2)
lack of subject matter protection for sound recordings fixed before 1972,
and(3) failure to comply with U.S. statutory formalities.53 Not
surprisingly, in light of the purposes of copyright and patent law and the
importance of the public domain, many consider § 514 to violate the
U.S. Constitution’s Copyright and Patent Clause by pulling works out of
the public domain—a belief that sparked the controversy in Golan v.
Holder.
III. GOLAN V. HOLDER
A. Background and Procedural History
Having previously relied extensively on the ability to utilize artistic
works in the public domain, “orchestra conductors, educators,
performers, publishers[,] film archivists and motion picture distributers”
all felt the impact of § 514.54 With increased performance fees, sheet
music rentals, and other royalties, these affected parties, including
Lawrence Golan, a teacher and performer of works by foreign
composers, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District
of Colorado.55 The plaintiffs contended that both the URAA and the
CTEA were unconstitutional,56 alleging that § 514 of the URAA (1)
violates Congressional limitations inherent in the Copyright and Patent
Clause, and (2) interferes with the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.
In light of the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft,57
where the Court rejected a nearly identical constitutional claim, the
district court granted summary judgment to the government on the
challenge to the CTEA.58 The district court further sided with the
government on the claims towards the URAA, granting summary
53. Id. See also Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 882 n.11. A common instance of failing to comply with
U.S. statutory formalities includes the failure to provide notice of copyright status, or to register and
renew a copyright—“formalities [that] drew criticism as a trap for the unwary.” Id. Congress
subsequently removed these formalities, making copyright protection extend to any original work “fixed
in a tangible medium of expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). However, there are still many incentives
for copyright owners to register their works, including as a requirement to sue for infringement. See
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 882. In 1992, Congress made renewal of copyright registration automatic for works
that were in their first term of copyright protection. Id.
54. See Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Golan I].
55. Id. at 1182.
56. Id.
57. 537 U.S. 186, 198 (2003) (rejecting a claim that the CTEA violated the limited times
provision of the Copyright and Patent Clause).
58. See Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1182.
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judgment on both claims under the Copyright and Patent Clause and the
First Amendment.59 The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.60
A panel for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of
the CTEA claim and the district court’s holding that § 514 did not
exceed the limitations of the Copyright and Patent Clause.61 In reaching
this conclusion, the court first rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the
Progress Clause and the limited times provision of the Copyright and
Patent Clause prevent Congress from copyrighting works in the public
domain.62 Though the court recognized that its holding would permit
Congress to adopt a “consistent practice of restoring works in the public
domain in an effort to confer perpetual monopolies,”63 it found that this
“troubling” situation was not before it.64 Although the Supreme Court
in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City stated, “Congress may not
authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict knowledge from the
public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available,”65
the Tenth Circuit reasoned that Graham did not “stand[] for the
proposition that, in the context of copyright, the public domain is a
threshold that Congress may not traverse in both directions.”66
In considering the First Amendment challenge to § 514, the Tenth
Circuit concluded that “the traditional contours of copyright protection
include the principle that works in the public domain remain there and
that § 514 transgresses this critical boundary,”67 demanding First
Amendment review under the Supreme Court’s standard in Eldred v.
Ashcroft.68 Since § 514 “implicates plaintiffs’ right to free expression,”
the Tenth Circuit remanded the case for further First Amendment
review.69
On remand for First Amendment review, both parties agreed that
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 1185.
62. See id. at 1186.
63. Id. at 1186.
64. Id. at 1186; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.186, 209 (2003).
65. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966); Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1186
(“Graham dealt with patents rather than copyright, and the ideas applicable to one do not automatically
apply to the other.”).
66. Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1187 (internal quotations omitted).
67. Id. at 1189.
68. See id. at 1197; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (“We recognize that the D.C. Circuit spoke too
broadly when it declared copyrights ‘categorically immune from challenges under the First
Amendment.’ But when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright
protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.”) (emphasis added).
69. Golan I, 501 F.3d at 1197.
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§ 514 is a content-neutral regulation of speech, requiring the application
of only intermediate scrutiny.70 Thus, the district court considered
whether § 514 “advances important governmental interests unrelated to
the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more
speech than necessary to further those interests.”71 The court granted
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment after concluding that “to the
extent Section 514 suppresses the right of reliance parties to use works
they exploited while the works were in the public domain,” § 514 was
unconstitutional.72
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s
analysis and instead found that § 514 was enacted to alleviate real
economic harm to American copyright holders due to foreign countries
refusing to provide copyright protection to American works abroad.73
Furthermore,
the
court
found
that
since
“foreign
countries . . . provide . . . only as much protection to American copyright
holders as the United States would provide to foreign copyright
holders,” § 514 imposes the same burden on American parties relying on
access to public domain works as it does to foreign parties.74 Because
“the burdens on speech are therefore directly focused to the harms that
the government sought to alleviate,”75 the Tenth Circuit found that § 514
withstood intermediate scrutiny and reversed the judgment of the district
court.76
The plaintiffs appealed the Tenth Circuit’s reversal and petitioned the
United States Supreme Court to find § 514 is invalid under the
Copyright and Patent Clause and the First Amendment.
B. The United States Supreme Court
After considering the parties’ briefs and amicus curiae briefs,77 the
Supreme Court, in a 6–2 decision, affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s
judgment, holding that § 514 of the URAA did not violate the Copyright
and Patent Clause or the First Amendment because neither provision

70. See Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1083 (10th Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Golan II].
71. Id. at 1083 (internal citations omitted).
72. Id. at 1082.
73. See id. at 1086.
74. Id. at 1091.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1095.
77. Amicus curiae included The Cato Institute, The American Civil Liberties Union, the
Conductors Guild, The Music Library Association, Google, the Motion Picture Association of America,
COURT
UNITED
STATES,
and
many
more.
See
Docket
File,
SUPREME
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-545.htm (last visited Aug. 21,
2012).
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“makes the public domain . . . a territory that works may never exit.”78
Justice Ginsburg, the author of Eldred v. Ashcroft,79 wrote the opinion
for the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor joined.80 Justice Breyer, who
dissented in Eldred,81 wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Alito
joined.82 Presumably, due to her involvement in the case as Solicitor
General, Justice Kagan recused herself and took no part in the
decision.83
1. Justice Ginsburg’s Majority Opinion
a. The Copyright and Patent Clause Claim
The petitioners argued that Congress lacked authority to enact § 514
under the Copyright and Patent Clause because the Clause erects “an
impenetrable barrier to the extension of copyright protection to authors
whose writings, for whatever reason, are in the public domain.”84
Justice Ginsburg disposed of this constitutional argument by looking to
the text of the Copyright and Patent Clause, historical practice, and
Supreme Court precedents.85
Looking at the plain language of the Copyright and Patent Clause,
Justice Ginsburg rejected petitioners’ argument that § 514 violated the
“limited times” provision because “removing works from the public
domain . . . turn[s] a fixed and predictable period into one that can be
reset or resurrected at any time, even after it expires.”86 Justice
Ginsburg noted that the Court’s decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft was

78. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012) (“In accord with the judgment of the Tenth
Circuit, we conclude that § 514 does not transgress constitutional limitations on Congress’ authority.
Neither the Copyright and Patent Clause nor the First Amendment, we hold, makes the public domain,
in any and all cases, a territory that works may never exit.”).
79. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
80. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 877; see also Docket File, SUPREME COURT UNITED STATES,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-545.htm (last visited Aug. 21,
2012).
81. See Eldred, 537 U.S. 186.
82. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873; see also Docket File, SUPREME COURT UNITED STATES,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-545.htm (last visited Aug. 21,
2012).
83. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873; see also SUPREME COURT UNITED STATES,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-545.htm (last visited Aug. 21,
2012).
84. Golan, 132 S. Ct. 884.
85. Id. at 885.
86. Id. at 884.
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“largely dispositive.”87 The Eldred Court held that the Copyright and
Patent Clause “does not convey a meaning so constricted,” such that
“the command that a time prescription, once set, becomes forever
‘fixed’ or ‘inalterable.’”88 Justice Ginsburg found the petitioners’
construction of the “limited times” provision to “closely resemble[] the
definition rejected in Eldred”89 and that petitioners failed to explain why
the copyright terms granted to foreign works under § 514 are unlimited,
especially in light of the fact that “the copyrights of restored foreign
works typically last for fewer years than those of their domestic
counterparts.”90 In an attempt to distinguish the § 514 copyright term
duration from that in Eldred, the petitioners asserted that Congress sets
the copyright term for foreign works excluded from U.S. protection to
exactly zero, resulting in a “limited time [that] had already passed for
works in the public domain.”91 Justice Ginsburg found “scant sense” in
the petitioners’ argument, reasoning that in order for a limited time of
exclusivity to run, it must first begin.92 The petitioners’ final argument
under the limited times provision was that upholding § 514 would
permit Congress to grant perpetual copyright protection, legislated in
installments.93 Justice Ginsburg rejected this argument of Congress’
“hypothetical legislative misbehavior” finding that “Congress can hardly
be charged with a design to move stealthily toward a regime of perpetual
copyrights.”94
Justice Ginsburg addressed petitioners’ “ultimate argument,”95 also
aimed toward a limitation found in the text of the Copyright and Patent
Clause, that § 514 fails to “promote the progress of science”96 because it
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 884–85.
90. Id. at 885. In describing the impact of § 514 on foreign works previously in the public
domain, Justice Ginsburg emphasized that § 514 included provisions to mitigate the harm to those
parties who relied on such works. See id. at 883. Some mitigating actions include: (1) anyone remains
free to copy and use restored works for one year following § 514’s enactment; (2) additional protections
for reliance parties; and (3) parties who created “derivative works” may indefinitely exploit the
derivation upon payment of the copyright holder of “reasonable compensation.” Additionally,
“[r]estored works . . . receive no compensatory time for the period of exclusivity they would have
enjoyed before § 514’s enactment” causing their term to “fall[] short of that available to similarly
situated U.S. works.” Id. at 882.
91. Id. at 885.
92. Id.
93. Id. (“Carried to its logical conclusion, petitioners persist, the Government’s position would
allow Congress to institute a second ‘limited’ term after the first expires, a third after that, and so on.”).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 887–88.
96. As noted above, the Progress Clause of the Copyright and Patent Clause states that
“Congress is empowered to ‘promote the progress of science and useful arts’ by enacting systems of
copyright and patent protection.” As Justice Ginsburg noted, “counterintuitively for the contemporary
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“deals solely with works already created . . . [and thus] provides no
plausible incentive to create new works.”97 Dismissing this assertion,
“nearly identical to the one” rejected in Eldred, Justice Ginsburg
reasoned that the creation of new works “is not the sole way Congress
may promote knowledge and learning.”98 Turning once again to the
precedential value of Eldred, Justice Ginsburg noted that the Court
previously held that the “[Copyright and Patent Clause] empowers
Congress to determine the intellectual property regimes that . . . serve
the ends of the Clause[,] . . . [a]nd those permissible ends . . . extend[]
beyond the creation of new works.”99 The Court found that inducing
dissemination of new works, unlike inducing creation of new works,
was an appropriate means for “promoting the progress of science.”100
This was evidenced by prior legislation making “copyright contingent
on publication.”101
Although the Court held that incentivizing creation of new works “is
not the sole means Congress may use under the [Progress Clause],”
Justice Ginsburg found § 514 to incentivize both dissemination and
creation of works.102 As for incentivizing the dissemination of works,
“[a] well-functioning international copyright system” would likely do so
by “expand[ing] foreign markets available to U.S. authors.”103
Furthermore, the Court found that § 514, and thus full compliance with
the Berne Convention, would incentivize creation of new works by
“invigorat[ing] protection against piracy of U.S. works abroad, thereby
benefitting copyright intensive industries stateside . . . .”104
In addition to addressing the direct text of the Copyright and Patent
Clause and the precedential authority interpreting it, Justice Ginsburg
looked toward historical practice in finding that § 514 did not violate the
Constitution. First, the Copyright Act of 1790, the Act that launched a
national system of copyright protection, granted copyright in works

reader, Congress’ copyright authority is tied to the progress of science; its patent authority, to the
progress of the useful arts.” Id. at 888.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
101. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888. Justice Ginsburg looked toward evidence that at the time of the
founding, inducing dissemination of creative works was a purpose of the Copyright and Patent Clause
contemplated by the fathers of the U.S. Constitution. See id. Particularly, at the time of the founding,
copyright protection was trained on “publication, not creation.” Id. Furthermore, “[u]ntil 1976, in fact,
Congress made federal copyright contingent upon publication, thereby providing incentives not
primarily for creation, but for dissemination.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
102. Id. at 889.
103. Id.
104. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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previously in the public domain.105 Thus, Justice Ginsburg reasoned
that “[t]he First Congress . . . did not view the public domain as
inviolate.”106 Subsequent legislation that restored copyright or patent
protection to works previously in the public domain were also
considered persuasive evidence of historical practice supporting the
enactment of § 514.107 Specifically, Justice Ginsburg cited unchallenged
private bills that restored copyrights of works,108 analogous patent bills,
upheld in litigation, that restored patent protection to inventions in the
public domain,109 and “generally applicable legislation granting patents
and copyrights to inventions and works that had lost protection.”110
Finding this historical practice helpful required Justice Ginsburg to
address the Supreme Court’s contradicting language in Graham v. John
Deere Co. of Kansas City.111 Justice Ginsburg found the statement,
“Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to
remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free
access to materials already available,”112 to be dicta that “did not speak
to the constitutional limits on Congress’ copyright and patent
authority.”113 Instead, the Court found the passage to “address[] an
invention’s very eligibility for patent protection.”114 Petitioners’ final
argument attempted to show that Congress’ historical practice in
granting copyright or patent protection to works previously in the public

105. Id. at 885–86 (“Before the Act launched a uniform national system, three States provided no
statutory copyright protection at all. Of those that did afford some protection, seven failed to protect
maps; eight did not cover previously published books; and all ten denied protection to works that failed
to comply with formalities.”).
106. Id. at 886.
107. Id.
108. See id. The latest of the private bills restoring copyright protection that Justice Ginsburg
found in support of the Court’s holding was passed in 1896. Id. (citing Act of Feb. 19, 1849 (Corson
Act), ch. 57, 9 Stat. 763; Act of June 23, 1874 (Helmuth Act), ch. 534, 18 Stat. 618; Act of Feb. 17,
1898 (Jones Act), ch. 29, 30 Stat. 1396).
109. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 886. The latest of the private bills restoring patent protection that
Justice Ginsburg found in support of the Court’s holding was passed in 1898. Id. See also Evans v.
Jordan, 13 U.S. 199 (1815) (upholding the validity of a patent’s over a flour mill, and thus upholding the
validity of the 1808 bill restoring patent protection); McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202 (1843)
(enforcing an 1839 amendment recognizing a patent over an invention despite a prior use bar).
110. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887 (“An 1832 statute authorized a new patent for any inventor whose
failure, ‘by inadvertence, accident, or mistake,’ to comply with statutory formalities rendered the
original patent ‘invalid or inoperative.’ An 1893 measure similarly allowed authors who had not timely
deposited their work to receive ‘all the rights and privileges’ the Copyright Act affords, if they made the
required deposit by March 1, 1893. And in 1919 and 1941, Congress authorized the President to issue
proclamations granting protection to foreign works that had fallen into the public domain during World
Wars I and II.”) (internal citations omitted).
111. 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
112. Id. (emphasis omitted).
113. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887.
114. Id.; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 202 n.7 (2003).
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domain occurred only in extraordinary situations. These situations
included “[i]nstalling a federal copyright system and ameliorating the
interruptions of global war.”115 Justice Ginsburg and the Court found
that complying with the Berne Convention was therefore a “signal
event.”116
b. The First Amendment Claim
As noted above, Justice Ginsburg similarly rejected petitioners’ claim
that § 514 offended the First Amendment.117 The “pathmarking
decisions in Eldred”118 once again proved largely determinative; Justice
Ginsburg declined to apply heightened review to § 514 because it leaves
untouched the “traditional contours of copyright protection,”119—the
“idea–expression dichotomy” and the “fair use” defense.120
Acknowledging that every grant of copyright protection inherently
restricts expression, the Court further found that § 514 did not disturb
“speech-protective purposes and safeguards embraced by copyright law”
because “[i]t deferred the date from which enforcement runs, and it
cushioned the impact of restoration on ‘reliance parties’ who exploited
[works previously in the public domain].”121
Justice Ginsburg squashed the petitioners’ attempt to distinguish their
case from Eldred in order to achieve higher scrutiny under the First
Amendment, thus “achiev[ing] under the banner of the First Amendment
what they could not win under the Copyright [and Patent] Clause.”122
The crux of the petitioners’ argument was that due to their unlimited and
unfettered use of works previously in the public domain, they enjoyed
vested rights in these works.123 Thus, since § 514 alters the public
domain, it also threatens the petitioners’ “interests of a higher order”
115. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 889.
118. Id.
119. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
120. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (“Due to this idea/expression distinction, every idea, theory, and
fact in a copyrighted work becomes instantly available for public exploitation at the moment of
publication; the author’s expression alone gains copyright protection.”) (internal quotations omitted); 17
U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). The fair use defense, codified at 17 U.S.C. §107, “allows the public to use not
only facts and ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also the author’s expression itself in certain
circumstances,” including but not limited to criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, and parody.
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890.
121. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 891.
122. Id. (“Petitioners here attempt to achieve under the banner of the First Amendment what they
could not win under the Copyright Clause: On their view of the Copyright Clause, the public domain is
inviolable; as they read the First Amendment, the public domain is policed through heightened judicial
scrutiny of Congress’ means and ends.”).
123. Id.
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which demands heightened judicial scrutiny.124 Just like the Copyright
and
Patent
Clause
claim,
Justice
Ginsburg
found
“nothing . . . warrant[ing] exceptional First Amendment solicitude for
copyrighted works that were once in the public domain.”125 Justice
Ginsburg rejected any vested rights that petitioners’ claimed, reasoning
that “no one, after the copyright term has expired, acquires ownership
rights in the once-protected works.”126 Justice Ginsburg further found
support in several instances of prior expansion to subject matter
protectable under copyright law, each of which did not demand
heightened First Amendment scrutiny.127 Thus, Justice Ginsburg
rejected the petitioners’ attempt to solicit a finding that the public
domain is inviolable by refusing to apply heightened judicial scrutiny to
§ 514. She instead held that the idea–expression dichotomy and the fair
use doctrine sufficiently protected speech.128
Thus, the Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s judgment refusing to
“second-guess the political choice Congress made between leaving the
public domain untouched and embracing Berne unstintingly.”129
2. Justice Breyer’s Dissent
As indicated by his emphatic disagreement with Justice Ginsburg’s
arguments, Justice Breyer dissented, and found § 514 to be
unconstitutional.130 Unlike Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer refused to
separate the two claims, instead finding § 514 to violate the Copyright
and Patent Clause interpreted in light of the First Amendment. Justice
Breyer believes that the Constitution should be interpreted “as a single
document—a document that we should not read as setting the Copyright
[and Patent] Clause and the First Amendment at cross-purposes.”131
Justice Breyer began his dissent by advocating for a “utilitarian view

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 892.
127. Id. (“Congress broke new ground when it extended copyright protection to foreign works in
1891; to dramatic works in 1856; to photographs and photographic negatives in 1865; to motion pictures
in 1912; to fixed sound recordings in 1972; and to architectural works in 1990.”) (internal citations
omitted).
128. See id. at 891.
129. Id. at 887.
130. See id. at 900 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 907–08 (“Nor need I advocate the application here of strict or specially heightened
review. I need only find that the First Amendment interest is important enough to require courts to
scrutinize with some care the reasons claimed to justify the Act in order to determine whether they
constitute reasonable copyright-related justifications for the serious harms, including speech-related
harms, which the Act seems likely to impose.”).
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of copyrights and patents,”132 one in which a copyright or patent may
only be “conferred for a public reason—to elicit new creation.”133 In
support of his view, Justice Breyer first looked to the history of
copyright law, including the Founding Fathers’ view of the law’s
underlying purpose.134 As Justice Breyer observed, the Framers were
well aware of Great Britain’s Eighteenth Century copyright statute, the
purpose of which was to “encourage [authors] to compose and write
useful books.”135 The “cultural quid pro quo”—encouraging authors “to
compose and write useful books [by] . . . provid[ing] a . . . right to print
and reprint those works”—was the basis for colonial copyright statutes
and the Copyright and Patent Clause.136 Even Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison supported a “limited conferral of monopoly rights only
‘as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce
utility.’”137 Though Justice Breyer sought to establish historical support,
much like Justice Ginsburg for the majority, his utilitarian understanding
of the Copyright and Patent Clause also finds support in more recent
case law and congressional reports on copyright legislation.138
Specifically, Justice Breyer cited five Supreme Court decisions and two
House Reports, each arguing that the purpose of Copyright and Patent
Clause is to “motivate the creative activity of authors [and inventors] by
the provision of a special reward.”139 It was the failure of § 514 to
132. Id. at 901.
133. Id. at 900 (“The possibility of eliciting new production is, and always has been, an essential
precondition for American copyright protection.”).
134. See id. at 901.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 379, 383 (J. Looney ed. 2009)) (emphasis omitted).
138. See id. at 902.
139. Id. at 902 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984); see also id. (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (Copyright embodies the view
that “encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors”)); Id. (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (Underlying copyright is the understanding that “creative work is to be
encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts”)); Id. (quoting Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 429
(“[M]onopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are . . . [not] primarily designed to provide a
special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may
be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors . . . by the provision of a special
reward.”)); Id. (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (The
“constitutional command . . . ‘[to] promote the Progress of [Science and the] useful Arts’ . . . is the
standard expressed in the Constitution and may not be ignored.”)); Id. (quoting Fox Film Corp. v.
Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the United States . . . lie[s] in the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors.”); see also id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1494, at 2
(1892) (The Copyright and Patent Clause says “nothing . . . about any desire or purpose to secure to the
author or inventor his ‘natural right to his property.”)); Id. at 902–03 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 2222, at 7
(1909) (The purpose underlying copyright and patent law is “that it will stimulate writing and
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“provid[e] any additional incentive for the production of new material,”
while “so seriously restrict[ing] dissemination,” that led Justice Breyer
to finding that the statute exceeded the Copyright and Patent Clause’s
limits.140
Justice Breyer pointed to two major ways that § 514 restricts the
dissemination of creative works.141 First, works that were previously in
the public domain may now require payment to the “restored copyright”
holder in order to use.142 Furthermore, costs of determining whether the
work is subject to § 514, including searching for the “restored
copyright” holder and negotiating a licensing fee with the holder,
“threaten to limit severely the distribution and use of those works.”143
The University of Michigan presents a prime example of the burden
these costs impose, where administrative costs would likely exceed $1
million.144
Justice Breyer recognized that “ordinary copyright protection also
comes accompanied with dissemination-restricting royalty charges and
administrative costs,” but found the restrictions caused by § 514 to
“work special harm.”145 In addition to the burdens discussed above,
according to Justice Breyer, removing copyrighted works from the
public domain “reverses the payment expectations” of those who used
such works.146 Additionally, Justice Breyer argued that § 514 abridges
preexisting freedoms to speak by removing repeatable expression.147
Finally, Justice Breyer claimed that the statute is “backward-looking”
which poses a greater risk of “trying to help known beneficiaries” rather
than the “not yet known” writer or musician who have yet to create their
works.148 The “special harm” of the restriction led Justice Breyer to
consider the reasons for passing § 514 to determine whether they
constitute “reasonable copyright related justification for the serious
harms.”149 Since the “statute does not motivate the creative activity of
authors,” thus lacking any “significant copyright-related quid pro quo,”
invention.”)).
140. Id. at 903 (emphasis omitted).
141. Id. at 904.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 905 (There are millions of “orphan works”—“older and more obscure works with
minimal commercial value that have copyright owners who are difficult or impossible to track down.”).
144. Id. (“The cost to the University of Michigan and the Institute of Museum and Library
Services, for example, to determine the copyright status of books contained in the HathiTrust Digital
Library that were published in the United States from 1923 to 1963 will exceed $1 million.”).
145. Id. at 906.
146. Id. (“This statute . . . restricts . . . Americans’ preexisting freedom to use formerly public
domain material in their expressive activities.”).
147. See id.
148. Id. at 907.
149. Id. at 908.
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Justice Breyer would find the serious harms unjustified, rendering § 514
unconstitutional.150
In explaining how § 514 “does not directly elicit any new
production,” Justice Breyer discounted much of the majority’s
support.151 Importantly, Justice Breyer dismissed Justice Ginsburg’s
reliance on private bills and other statutes that retroactively granted
protection to works previously in the public domain, finding it
“farfetched”152 to analogize those statutes—enacted in special
circumstances or for comparable equitable reasons—to present law.153
Further illuminating the weakness of this “historical practice” that the
majority found so persuasive, Justice Breyer emphasized that
congressional practice actually shows the contrary—a “virtually
unbroken string of legislation preventing the withdrawal of works from
the public domain.”154 Justice Breyer further addressed the majority’s
reasoning that the Progress Clause does not require creation of new
works by emphasizing that “initial creation . . . is the special concern of
copyright protection,” and regardless, § 514 confers copyright
monopolies to “restored works” which restricts dissemination compared
to a free market.155
As Justice Breyer saw it, the Copyright and Patent Clause requires a
utilitarian balance in which no copyright or patent monopoly may be
conferred without the public benefit of incentivizing creation and
invention156—something that § 514 failed to accomplish by
“withdrawing material from the public domain, [thus] inhibit[ing] an
important preexisting flow of information.”157

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 909.
153. Id.. (“But special circumstances, like wars, hurricanes, earthquakes, and other disasters,
prevent the realization in practice of a reasonable expectation of securing or maintaining a preexisting
right. Private bills are designed to provide special exceptions for comparable equitable reasons.”).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 910 (“The Court has not, to my knowledge, previously accepted such a rational—a
rationale well removed from the special economic circumstances that surround the non-repeatable costs
of the initial creation of a ‘Writing.’ And I fear that doing so would read the Copyright Clause as if it
were a blank check made out in favor of those who are not themselves creators.”); Id. (“This argument,
whatever its intrinsic merits, is an argument that directly concerns a private benefit: how to obtain more
money from the sales of existing products. It is not an argument about a public benefit, such as how to
promote or to protect the creative process.”).
156. See id. at 900.
157. Id. at 912.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss3/7

18

Kappers: Is What You Give, Really What You Get? The Effect of Golan v. Hol

2013]

CASENOTE—GOLVAN V. HOLDER

1071

IV. DISCUSSION
A. Golan Furthers the Supreme Court’s Disappointing Treatment of the
Public Domain
Just nine years after the Court effectively opened up the door for
Congress to prevent copyrighted works from entering the public domain
in Eldred,158 Justice Ginsburg in Golan struck a second blow by
rejecting the established view that the public domain is absolute.159 In
doing so, the Court underestimated the importance of the inherent
limitation of the Copyright and Patent Clause and relied on unpersuasive
arguments supporting its reading.
The Copyright and Patent Clause, as the only enumerated power to
contain both an “ends” and a “means” clause,160 should be interpreted to
limit Congressional power to grant copyrights and patents only when the
progress in science and useful arts is promoted.161 In addressing the
petitioners’ argument that § 514 is unconstitutional because it provides
no incentive for authors to create new works,162 Justice Ginsburg failed
to recognize that § 514 does not promote the progress of science. First,
the only suggestion that § 514 induces creation of new works is that it
expands foreign markets and invigorates protection against piracy, thus
inducing investment in the creative process.163 This reasoning fails,
because when the United States became a member to the Berne
Convention, it provided prospective copyright protection, unlike § 514
which is a backward-looking statute.164 In other words, the works
granted retroactive protection by § 514 have already been created, so no
inducement can occur. Additionally, though advocates of § 514 suggest
158. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (permitting the extension of copyright protection to
existing works so long as the extension is not perpetual).
159. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
160. See Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress
as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1774 (2006). The
Copyright and Patent Clause contains a “to” and a “by,” an “ends” and a “means,” whereas all other
clauses—such as “[t]o borrow money” or “[t]o regulate commerce”—only contain the “ends” clause.
Id.
161. Id. at 1776 (addressing four interpretations of the Copyright and Patent Clause: the first
regarding the Progress Clause merely as a preamble with no limitation on Congress’ power, the second,
regarding the Progress Clause as a limitation of power, the third reads the Progress Clause as a grant of
power and the “Exclusive Rights Clause” as a limitation on it, and the fourth reading the Copyright and
Patent Clause to confer two separate powers). Though Courts and commentators generally consider the
Progress Clause to be a non-binding preamble and the Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft explicitly
did not consider the issue of whether the Progress Clause acts as a limitation because the petitioner’s
conceded the point. Id. at 1828.
162. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888.
163. See id. at 889.
164. Id. at 907 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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it is necessary to ensure that foreign countries extend retroactive
copyright protection to U.S. works, this does not bolster the creative
process. As Justice Breyer suggested, it is an argument that “directly
concerns a private benefit: how to obtain more money from the sales of
existing products.”165 Furthermore, even accepting the Court’s reading
that the primary purpose of the Copyright and Patent Clause may be
satisfied by the dissemination of creative works, § 514 restricts
dissemination instead of promoting it. The very nature of works in the
public domain is that they are subject to copying, which “is not always
discouraged or disfavored by the laws which preserve our competitive
economy.”166 On the other hand, the very nature of a copyright is that
the author has an “exclusive Right to their respective Writings”167 in the
form of a limited monopoly. Thus, copyright protection normally
restricts dissemination by preventing the free accessibility of works.
Furthermore, as Justice Breyer points out, § 514 erects additional
difficulties to dissemination by increasing administrative costs and
royalties.168
In justification of permitting Congress to copyright works that were
once freely accessible in the public domain, Justice Ginsburg relied on
antiquated legislation while ignoring historical practice. The legislation
that the Court cited should hardly be considered persuasive as evidence
that public domain should be considered unbounded. It is weak
evidence to consider century-old private bills (legislation that applies
only to an individual or a group of individuals169) as well as legislation
passed in extraordinary situations (such as enacting a federal copyright
and patent system and to address disruptions due to global war170) to be
accurate measures of historical practice supporting § 514. Though
Justice Ginsburg considers § 514 to be a similar “signal event,”
rendering such legislation as a benchmark of historical practice, actual
Congressional practice behind the passage of § 514 suggests
otherwise.171 Though the Berne Convention took effect in 1886,172 the
United States did not become a party to the Convention until 1989.

165. Id. at 910.
166. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) (quoting Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989)).
167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
168. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 900 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
169. See id. at 886 (majority opinion) (Justice Ginsburg cited numerous private bills that restored
copyright and patent protection to works and inventions previously in the public domain).
170. See id. (discussing the Copyright Act of 1790 and legislation passed to ameliorate the effects
of global war on copyrighted works).
171. Id. at 887 (“Yet the TRIPS accord, leading the United States to comply in full measure with
Berne, was also a signal event.”).
172. Berne Convention, supra note 39, at art. 1.
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Furthermore, when the United States finally did become a party,
“Congress adopted a minimalist approach to compliance with the
Convention,” initially punting on the issue of retroactive protection
embodied by § 514.173 Thus, although Congress eventually voted to
enact the retroactive protection of § 514, it dragged its feet in doing so,
much to the dismay of other Berne Convention members.174 Unlike as
Justice Ginsberg suggested, such delay is not characteristic of a signal
event, such as global war. To the contrary, Congress’s consistent
hesitation in enacting retroactive protection175 suggests that the passage
of § 514 was contrary to historical practice, making Justice Ginsburg’s
reliance on the discussed legislation unavailing.
In giving excessive weight to such legislation, the majority
overlooked the overwhelming trend of preventing works from leaving
the public domain.176 Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg contradicted
herself by distinguishing Graham177 immediately after supporting her
conclusion on § 514 by describing a private bill that granted a patent on
an invention despite the employer’s prior use of the invention.178 Justice
Ginsburg found Graham’s passage—“Congress may not authorize the
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge
from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already
available”179—to be dicta that speaks to “an invention’s very eligibility
for patent protection” and not “constitutional limits on Congress’
copyright and patent authority.”180 She simultaneously found private
bills restoring patent protection that “absent such dispensation, [prior
use] would have rendered the invention unpatentable,” to be evidence
that the public domain may be disturbed—evidence of constitutional
limits on Congress’ authority.181 If the Court properly interpreted the
language at issue in Graham, such private bills should be criticized for
granting patent protection to ineligible matter, rather than used as a basis
to find that the public domain is unbounded.
The Court in Golan should have found § 514 to be unconstitutional

173. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 879.
174. Id. at 880.
175. Id. at 879 (Upon joining the Berne Convention’s implementation, Congress adopted a
“minimalist approach” and “defer[ed] consideration until a more thorough examination of
Constitutional, commercial, and consumer considerations [was] possible.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
176. See id. at 909 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
177. See id. at 887 (majority opinion).
178. See id. (discussing an 1839 amendment that recognized a patent on an invention despite its
prior use by the inventor’s employer).
179. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
180. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 887 (emphasis added).
181. See id. (emphasis added).
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by giving more consideration to the importance of the public domain.
The utilitarian view of the Copyright and Patent Clause, in which
copyrights and patents must only be granted if they elicit new creation
or invention, is the most appropriate interpretation of the Clause, and
should have been accorded more weight. The text of the Copyright and
Patent Clause,182 the historical context in which it was drafted,183 and the
case law interpreting it, all provide support for the reading that § 514
does not satisfy this purpose.184
Section 514 fails to elicit creation of new works because it is a
backward-looking provision, meaning that it grants copyright protection
over works already created and in the public domain.185 This is
especially the case when considering that works in the public domain,
including those being removed, are often the foundation for further
creativity.186 Thus, it is more likely that § 514 lowers incentive and
motivation to author creative works by removing the number of works
available to potential authors that would use those works as building
blocks. Assume, for instance, that the painting of Mona Lisa by
Leonardo da Vinci was removed from the public domain via subsequent
copyright protection. This building block for future derivative works
would no longer be freely accessible, lowering the motivation for
authors to produce new works like Marcel Duchamp’s derivative work
of Mona Lisa in L.H.O.O.Q.187 Though the Court found inducing
dissemination as an appropriate means to promote science, the Court
182. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 146 (1989) (“The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation
and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the
‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”).
183. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 901 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 379, 383 (J. Looney ed.
2009)); see also Oliar, supra note 160, at 1774 (2006) (Progress Clause operates as a limitation).
184. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146 (“As we have noted in the past, the Clause contains both a
grant of power and certain limitations upon the exercise of that power.”); Graham, 383 U.S. at 6
(“Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites
in a patent system which by constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.’
This is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.”) (emphasis added).
185. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 907 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
186. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (Defining “derivative work” as “a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations,
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a
‘derivative work.’”); Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146 (“From their inception, the federal patent laws have
embodied a careful balance between the need to promote innovation and the recognition that imitation
and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a
competitive economy.”) (emphasis added).
187. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (Defining “derivative work”); L.H.O.O.Q., WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L.H.O.O.Q. (last visited Aug. 22, 2012).
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mistakenly believed § 514 promoted dissemination. As Justice Breyer
acutely pointed out, § 514 increases administrative costs in determining
whether a work is subject to copyright, as well as, costs related to
negotiating a licensing agreement.188 Therefore, § 514 fails the quid pro
quo requirement embedded in the Copyright and Patent Clause by
lowering incentive to produce and disseminate new works.
B. Golan’s Impact in Intellectual Property Law
Strictly speaking, the Court’s holding in Golan v. Holder addresses a
specific issue in copyright law, answering in the affirmative that
Congress may extend copyright protection to works previously in the
public domain.189 Golan’s impact will surely be felt the strongest in the
copyright arena, but to consider the Supreme Court’s holding in such a
narrow view would be to ignore intricate areas of overlap between
copyright and patent law. To the contrary, the effect of this decision
will seep through to other areas of intellectual property law.190
There are many overlaps between copyright and patent law that
render the Golan decision applicable to both arenas. First, Congress is
empowered to enact federal copyright and patent laws by the same
clause of the U.S. Constitution.191 Sharing the same constitutional
foundation, that in which Congress may pass laws to “promote the
progress of science and useful arts,” provides that copyright and patent
law share the same purpose. Specifically, “the economic philosophy
behind the Copyright [and Patent] Clause is the conviction that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to

188. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 907 (Breyer, J., dissenting). There are millions of “ophan works”—
“older and more obscure works with minimal commercial value that have copyright owners who are
difficult or impossible to track down.” Id.
189. Id. at 878 (majority opinion) (“Neither the Copyright and Patent Clause nor the First
Amendment, we hold, makes the public domain, in any and all cases, a territory that works may never
exit.”).
190. The following sections will address the clear overlap between copyright and patent law, but
Golan may likewise affect areas of trademark law as well. Courts were once confused about whether
trademark protection could be extended to subject matter previously protected by an expired copyright
or patent. See generally Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003);
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001). Although the TrafFix court appeared
to permit the extension of trademark protection, it refused to resolve the question of whether the Patent
and Copyright Clause prohibits a holder of an expired patent from claiming trade dress protection,
stating that if trademark’s functionality doctrine fails to handle the issue, “that will be time enough to
address the matter.” TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 35. I believe Golan answers the “TrafFix Question,”
permitting trademark protection to extend to subject matter of an expired copyright or patent. After all,
Justice Ginsburg rejected the argument that the “Constitution renders the public domain largely
untouchable by Congress,” suggesting that Congress is acting within its constitutional limits when
extending the Lanham Act to subject matter in the public domain. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 891.
191. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
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advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors.”192
The Supreme Court also acknowledged the shared similarities between
the two areas of law, occasionally employing doctrines once specific to
one area of law to the other. For example, copyright law may, in part,
thank federal patent laws for its doctrines governing inducing
infringement193 and contributory liability.194
Golan then treats the public domain of copyright and patent law
equally, such that artists and inventors who utilize works in the public
domain should be weary that their creations and inventions may be
undercut by retroactive protection of such works.195 Though Congress
and the Supreme Court have felt comfortable in extending copyright
protection, proactively and retroactively,196 it is unclear whether they
would be as committed to doing the same for inventions in the public
domain.197
Because the facts of Golan expose the dangers of treating the public
domain with such disregard, consider the following situation in order to
expose Golan’s potential impact on patent law. Suppose that a company
invents a new pharmaceutical drug, and obtains a patent protecting its
novel compound. However, after seven and one-half years, the
company fails to pay the United States Patent and Trademark Office the
appropriate maintenance fee,198 allowing the invention to advance to the
public domain free for people to utilize. Generic drug companies begin

192. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 214 (2003) (“As we have explained, ‘the economic
philosophy behind the Copyright Clause is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors.’”);
see also In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 958 (The constitutionally-stated purpose of granting patent rights to
inventors for their discoveries is the promotion of progress in the “useful Arts.” Likewise, the purpose
of granting copyrights to authors for their writings is the promotion of progress of science.).
193. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
194. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
195. It should be noted that federal patent law requires that an invention be novel, including that
an invention not be previously used or on sale in this country. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). Thus, if
Congress were to enact retroactive protection to inventions previously in the public domain, it would
need to exclude the application of § 102 to such works. Copyright law does not contain a similar
provision.
196. See Eldred, 537 U.S. 186; Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
197. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite, Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126–27 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“[S]ometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts,’ the constitutional objection of patent and copyright protection.”); Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012) (“Patent protection is, after
all, a two-edged sword. On the one hand, the promise of exclusive rights provides monetary incentives
that lead to creation, invention, and discovery. On the other hand, that very exclusivity can impede the
flow of information that might permit, indeed spur, invention, by, for example, raising the price of using
the patented ideas once created, requiring potential users to conduct costly and time-consuming searches
of existing patents and pending patent applications, and requiring the negotiation of complex licensing
arrangements.”).
198. 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(f) (2012).
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expensive preparations for manufacturing, marketing, and selling the
pharmaceutical, while other companies engage in research and
development for additional scientific advancements that require its use.
It seems like the patent system is working at its best, allowing the public
domain invention to act as the building block of scientific advancement
and economic competition. However, because Golan suggests that
Congress may retroactively extend copyright protection under § 514 for
“failure to comply with U.S. statutory formalities,” 199 the logical
inference is that Congress may retroactively extend patent protection for
failing to pay a maintenance fee, undercutting the work and
advancements made by those relying on the accessibility of the public
domain.
This hypothetical, as well as the discussion of the Golan decision,
leaves authors and inventors in a very precarious position. While the
Supreme Court suggests that “copying is not always discouraged or
disfavored,”200 and that “imitation and refinement through imitation
are . . . the very lifeblood of an economy,”201 it has simultaneously
granted Congress permission to disadvantage those who do.
C. Ameliorating Golan’s Impact
This Note primarily has addressed the damaging effect of Golan v.
Holder on the public domain, suggesting that it should have been
decided differently. Thus, it is recommended that either Congress repeal
§ 514 or that the courts reverse course and find § 514 to be outside of
the scope of the Copyright and Patent Clause. However, with the U.S.
Supreme Court upholding the constitutionality of congressionally
enacted legislation, the recourse available for authors and inventors who
employ public domain works appears slim. Though we can now only
hope that Golan does not stifle artistic creativity, technological
advancement, and economic competition, Congress and the courts can
still take actions to ameliorate Golan’s effect.
Congress did make some attempts to reduce the burden imposed by
§ 514, such as, imposing no liability for use of works prior to retroactive
protection; allowing anyone to copy restored works for one year
following enactment; permitting “reliance parties” to continue using a
restored work until provided notice by the copyright holder of intent to

199. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 108 Stat. 4809 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§
104A, 109(a) (1994)).
200. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001).
201. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146, 156 (1989) (“[W]e
have consistently reiterated the teaching of Sears and Compco that ideas once placed before the public
without the protection of a valid patent are subject to appropriation without significant restraint.”).
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enforce the copyright; and permitting authors of derivative works to
exploit their works upon paying “reasonable compensation” to the
copyright holder.202 Congress must go further, however, because these
provisions are insufficient in light of the importance of the public
domain in incentivizing the creation of artistic works and technological
advancements. Congress should enact legislation to permit reliance
parties to freely exploit a restored work indefinitely. Similarly, an
author of a derivative work should not be forced to compensate the
holder of the restored copyright for creating a work by building off of
the public domain. These provisions would strengthen the protections
currently in place, and provide some sort of relief from the damage
imposed by § 514.
Courts are also in a position to mitigate the consequences of the
Golan decision. One way would be to recognize infringing uses of a
restored copyright to be fair use. Fair use is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107,
which provides that fair use of a copyrighted work is not
infringement.203 Expanding the umbrella of fair use to cover restored
copyrights would acknowledge that exploitation of works once freely
accessible, and only subsequently removed from the public domain, is
more “fair” than the exploitation or works always under copyright
protection. The negative impact of Golan would be significantly
lessened if courts apply this expansive interpretation of the fair use
doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
By permitting subsequent authors and inventors to build off of prior
creative works and inventions, the public domain continues to play a
vital role in our federal copyright and patent systems. The Supreme
Court in Golan v. Holder has struck a blow to the public domain by
failing to appreciate the utilitarian approach to copyrights and patents,
which recognizes that the Copyright and Patent Clause prohibits the
extension of protection without eliciting creation or invention. Though
the Court’s decision has made it more challenging for the world’s next
Steve Jobs, there is always hope that Congress and the courts will
acknowledge the strain § 514 places on authors and inventors and take
action to ameliorate its damaging effects.

202. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 883 (2012).
203. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
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